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UNITED STATES RATIFICATION OF THE
AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 26,1945, a delegation from the United States Department of
State met in San Francisco with representatives from fifty countries to
sign the Charter of the United Nations.' Affirming "faith in
fundamental human rights"2 and pledging to promote "universal
respect for, and observance of... fundamental freedoms for all,"3 the
members of the United Nations elevated individual rights to the level of
international concern, and the United States formalized its commitment
to the protection of human rights worldwide.
The human rights provisions in the U.N. Charter were largely a
result of efforts by the United States4 toward "the day when all worthy
human beings may be permitted to live decently as free people."' This
effort soon led to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,6 a
cornerstone of contemporary human rights law and the first part of an
international bill of rights modeled after the U.S. Constitution.
Americans were prominent among the architects and builders of
international human rights, and American constitutionalism was a
principal inspiration and model for them. As a result, most of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and later the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are in their essence American
constitutional rights projected around the world."
* This work has benefited from the generous advice and contributions of Professor
Benedict Kingsbury, Exeter College, Oxford; Christina Cerna, Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights; Professor Tom Farer, American University School of Law; Pat Rengel, Chief
Counsel, Amnesty International, U.S.A.; Lynn Boyer, Legislative Counsel to Senator Jesse
Helms; Dr. Robert Friedlander, Chief Le islative Counsel to Minority Members, United States
Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Melisandre Hodges, Perkins Library, Duke University.
1. For a discussion of events surrounding the signing of the Charter, see John H. Crider,
Truman Closes U.N. Conference with Plea to Translate Charter into Deeds, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,1945,
at Al.
2. U.N. CHARTER, pmbl., para. 2.
3. Id. art. 55, para. c.
4. Louis Sohn, A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights, in
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
39, 43-56 (1968).
5. Harry S. Truman, Address to the Closing Session of the United Nations Conference,
San Francisco, Program Closing Plenary Session, June 26, 1945, 1 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 687, 717
(1945).
6. G.A. Res. 217A (III) U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. at 71-77, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration].
7. Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLuM. L. REV. 405, 415 (1979). See
generally Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and International Human Rights Law, 3
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 53 (1990) (arguing United States constitutionalism contributed significantly
to the development of international human rights law).
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During the drafting of the U.N. Charter and the Universal
Declaration, the United States took the lead in shaping international
human rights programs and policies.8 It was among the most diligent
nations in promoting U.N. efforts toward human rights protection
throughout the late 1940s.' In fact, it was an American, Eleanor
Roosevelt, who was the driving force behind the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights."
The momentum to formalize international human rights protection
soon carried into regional organizations which created their own
instruments to safeguard human rights. The European nations were the
first to undertake legally binding obligations by adopting the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention)." Likewise, the Organization of
American States (OAS) formalized a regional system of protection in the
Americas with a similar instrument, the American Convention on
Human Rights (American Convention).'2
While the European Convention enjoys support among all the
principal European nations, 3 the American Convention lacks the
support of one of the most influential nations of the Americas - the
United States. With twenty-three American nations already parties to
the American Convention, 4 the United States has yet to ratify it.
Although the Convention was signed by President Carter in 1978, it has
yet to attain a two-thirds vote in the Senate as required for ratification
8. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 188 (1973) (testimony of Professor
Thomas Buergenthal).
9. J. GREEN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 28-29, 37 n.20 (1956).
10. For an account of Mrs. Roosevelt's participation in drafting the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, see Richard Gardner, Eleanor Roosevelt's Legacy: Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 1988, at 27.
11. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened
for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]. For a
discussion of the development of regional systems, see Thomas Buergenthal, International
Human Rights Law and Institutions: Accomplishments and Prospects, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1988).
12. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M.
101 (1970) (OAS Doc. OEA/SER. K/XVI/1.1 Doc. 65 (1970)) [hereinafter American Convention).
For a discussion of the evolution of the American system for human rights protection and the
American Convention, see Thomas Buergenthal, Introduction to the Inter-American System, in
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS 1-22 (Thomas Buergenthal
et al. eds., 3d ed. 1990).
13. Jean-Bernard Mairie, International Instruments Relating to Human Rights: Classification
and Chart Showing Ratifications as of 1 January 1990, 11 HUM. RTS. L.J. 175,184 (1990). Signatories
include Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany/Fed. Rep., Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San
Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Id.
14. The following states are parties to the American Convention as of January 1, 1990:
Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. at 186.
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by Article VI of the United States Constitution." While the Senate held
hearings to discuss the issues surrounding ratification in 1979,16 it has
not taken action on the Convention for the past thirteen years.
Senate action on the American Convention requires more than a
willingness to endorse a general declaration of human rights. It
mandates a commitment to accept the human rights norms in the
Convention as legally binding obligations; a commitment which raises
diplomatic, political, and legal concerns that have forestalled
ratification.'
This Note advocates ratification of the American Convention.
Through an examination of legal issues surrounding ratification, it
demonstrates that there are no significant legal barriers blocking the
United States from becoming a party, and that participation in this
international treaty would best serve the interests of the United States.
II. THE AMERICAN CONVENTION
Negotiated at San Jos6, Costa Rica in 1969, with the active
participation of the United States,' the American Convention is an
international agreement that operates within the framework of the OAS.
The Convention catalogs human rights to be protected in the region and
provides for international monitoring and enforcement of those rights.20
The current Inter-American human rights system is based on three legal
sources: the OAS Charter (Charter),2' the American Declaration of
Human Rights (Declaration)," and the American Convention. The
15. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
16. International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Human Rights Hearings].
17. In addition to the American Convention, President Carter signed three other human
rights conventions that were also sent to the Senate for their advice and consent. See President's
Message to the Senate on Human Rights Treaties, PUB. PAPERS 395-96 (1978). The other
conventions are the following: The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XX1), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXII), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); The International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106A (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14,
at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965). Although the United States Senate recently gave its advice and
consent to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United States has yet
to ratify any of these conventions. 138 CONG. REC. 84781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
18. For a discussion of diplomatic, political, and legal concerns regarding U.S. ratification
of human rights treaties, see Bruno Bitker, U.S. Policy on Ratification of Human Rights Covenants,
11 HUM. Ris. J. 653 (1969). See also David Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human
Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35 (1978) (discussing the background of human rights
covenants and reasons why U.S. citizens should be interested in their ratification).
19. For drafting history, see Buergenthal, supra note 12, at 4-6.
20. American Convention, supra note 12, art. 41, 9 I.L.M. at 112.
21. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119
U.N.T.S. 3.
22. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, Res. XXX of the Ninth
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Charter serves as the constitution of the OAS and includes a legally
binding obligation on the part of member states to "respect the rights of
the individual and the principles of universal morality." ' This phrase,
however, is vague, and neither individual rights nor principles of
morality are defined in the Charter. The Declaration, originally drafted
as a nonbinding conference resolution,24 has come to serve as the
authoritative interpretation of the "fundamental rights of the individual"
included in the Charter.'5
The American Convention creates legally binding obligations for
OAS member states that have signed and ratified it. The Convention
specifies the basic civil and political rights to be protected throughout the
western hemisphere.' It protects many of the same basic liberties
guaranteed by the United States Bill of Rights.' including freedom of
religion, speech, assembly,'F the right to a fair trial,' the right to
property~a freedom from slavery," and equal protection of the law.'2
The American Convention also establishes an Inter-American Court3
International Conference of American States, OEA/Ser. L/V/l.50 doc. 6, rev. 1, (1953), reprinted
in HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS 237 (1953).
23. OAS CHARTER art. 13.
24. Thomas Buergenthal, The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human Rights, 69
AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 829 (1975).
25. Buergenthal, supra note 11, at 16.
Although the American Declaration, not unlike the Universal Declaration, was not
deemed to be legally binding at the time it was proclaimed in 1948, it has now been
accepted as a normative instrument of the Inter-American System that contains the
authoritative catalogue of the Human Rights which all State Parties to the OAS
Charter are required to promote.
Id.
26. American Convention, supra note 12, 9 I.L.M. at 101.
27. Although the wording of the provisions of the American Convention differs from that
of the U.S. Constitution, the United States Department of Justice has determined that with the
appropriate reservations, the provisions of the Convention accord with U.S. Constitutional law.
U.S. Dept. of State, Letter to President Carter, Dec. 17, 1977, in RICHARD B. LILLICH, U.S.
RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS? 105 (1981)
[hereinafter Letter to President Carter]. See also Human Rights Hearings, supra note 16, at 7
(statement of Warren Christopher) ("In essence, the [pending human rights] treaties create an
international commitment to the same basic human rights that already are guaranteed to
citizens of the United States by our own laws and constitution.").
28. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I with American Convention, supra note 12, arts. 12-13,
15, 9 I.L.M. at 105-06 (granting rights to freedom of religion, expression, and assembly).
29. Compare U.S. CONST. amends. V-VI with American Convention, supra note 12, arts. 7-8,
9 I.L.M. at 103-04 (granting freedom from arbitrary arrest and the right to fair trial).
30. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV with American Convention, supra note 12, art. 21,
9 I.L.M. at 107 (granting right to property).
31. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XII with American Convention, supra note 12, art. 6, 9
I.L.M. at 103 (granting freedom from slavery).
32. Compare U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV with American Convention, supra note 12, art. 24,
9 I.L.M. at 108 (granting right to equal protection).
33. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court) was established by Article 33 of
THE AMERICAN CONVENTION
and expands the authority of the Inter-American Commission
(Commission)' to serve as the enforcement mechanism for the rights
provided by the Convention. The effectiveness of this human rights
protection system depends upon the participation of all American
countries.3
The American Convention reflects an effort by its drafters to provide
a minimum standard of decency among American countries in their
treatment of individuals. In many ways this effort resembles that of the
drafters of the Universal Declaration, in which the United States played
a significant role.36 The crucial difference, however, is that the
the Convention to oversee the application and interpretation of the Convention. American
Convention, supra note 12, art. 33, 9 LL.M. at 111. It consists of seven judges elected from the
OAS member states. Only state parties to the Convention have locus standi before the Court;
however, complaints brought by individuals may be forwarded to the Court through the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. See id. art. 61, para. 1, 9 LL.M. at 117. The Court has
advisory jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of any OAS treaty concerning human rights.
It also has jurisdiction to render judgment against states in breach of the Convention provided
that those states have recognized the Court's jurisdiction through declaration or agreement. Id.
art. 63, 9 I.L.M. at 118. It may determine the rights to be accorded an injured party and the
amount of damages due. It may also grant temporary injunctions. Decisions by the Court are
final and are not subject to appeal. See Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, 76 AM. J. INTL L. 231 passim (1982).
34. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights consists of seven members elected
by the OAS General Assembly from a list of candidates submitted by the governments of
member states. It was established under the Convention as a body to receive complaints from
private individuals concerning human rights violations by OAS member states. American
Convention, supra note 12, arts. 34,41,9 I.L.M. at 111-12. Its authority has expanded under the
Convention and it now serves as a body to: develop an awareness of human rights issues in
the Americas; make recommendations to governments for the progressive adoption of human
rights measures; conduct studies and prepare regular reports; request information from member
states regarding the measures they have taken to further human rights; and take action on
complaints brought under the Convention. Complaints (communications) may be brought
before the Commission either by a state against another state or by an individual or non-
governmental organization against a state. When presented with a communication from an
individual or member state alleging a violation of the Convention, the Commission will forward
relevant portions of the communication to the government of the member state involved and
request a response, usually within sixty days. The Commission then establishes the facts
involved in the case and seeks a friendly settlement. If no settlement is reached, it may send
the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for a decision, or it may set forth its own
conclusions and opinions, making recommendations and setting a time limit for state
compliance. If a state fails to comply, the Commission may choose to publish a report on the
situation. See generally Robert Norris, The New Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, 1 HUM. RIS. L.J. 379 (1980) (discussing the background and content of the statute
establishing the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).
35. Thomas Buergenthal, The American Convention on Human Rights, in U.S. RATIFICATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, supra note 27, at 47,51 ("[I] doubt very much that without full U.S.
participation the Inter-American system will realize its full potential, and that would be a great
pity indeed.").
36. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. See also Bruno Bitker, The United States and
International Codification of Human Rights: A Case of Split Personality, in NATAuE KAUFMAN
HEVENER, THE DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 77, 77 (1981) (stating that the history of United
States policy on human rights treaties reflects a classic case of split personality; although
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standards set out in the Universal Declaration were intended to be
nonbinding, whereas the American Convention carries with it legal
obligations that the United States is reluctant to assume.
The principal reason for this reluctance is fear that international
obligations created by the Convention will interfere with the domestic
affairs of the United States. These obligations would place the
supervision and control of human rights in the hands of an international
body over which the United States does not have exclusive control.'
The most common arguments against ratification can be divided into
three categories.
The first of these categories is comprised of federalist arguments
which assert that ratification by the United States would legitimize
federal interference in areas that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the states.' The second category of objections are sovereignty
arguments. This debate centers around the idea that human rights are
exclusively a domestic issue and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of an
international organization.39 Finally, the third type of argument consists
of objections to the "right-to-life" provision in Article 4 of the
Convention, since this Article raises questions about the legality of the
death penalty and abortion.4°
III. FEDERALIST CONCERNS:
THE ISSUE OF STATES' RIGHTS
One of the most prevalent arguments against ratification of the
American Convention is based on the belief that it would interfere with
the federalist system to allow the President to enter into an international
agreement that would legally bind the states. Because Article VI of the
United States Constitution establishes that treaties become the "supreme
law of the land,"4' certain provisions of the Convention potentially
could interfere with state legislation or force the states to rearrange their
current criminal codes.'
leading multinational crusades for human rights in the 1940s, the U.S. has ratified only one
human rights treaty since then).
37. Arthur Rovine, Defense of Declarations, Reservations, and Understandings, in U.S.
RATICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, supra note 27, at 55,61. See also Natalie Hevener
Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in the United States Senate: The
Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10 HuM. RTS. Q. 309 (1988) (discussing Cold War fears that led
to the Bricker Amendment).
38. See discussion infra part Ill.B.
39. See discussion infra part IV.
40. See discussion infra part V.A.
41. U.S. CoNsr. art. VI.
42. See American Bar Association, Report of the Standing Committee on Peace and Law
Through United Nations Human Rights Conventions and Recommendations, 1 INT'L LAW. 600, 616
THE AMERICAN CONVENTION
The United States traditionally has been reluctant to change domestic
laws through international treaties.4 Rather than welcome international
human rights treaties as potential improvements of domestic law, it has
taken measures to weaken the domestic effect of ratified international
human rights instruments in general, and of this Convention in
particular.
A. Self-Executing Treaties
A primary means used by the United States to undercut the domestic
effect of human rights treaties has been to classify these treaties as not
self-executing. The judicial doctrine of self-executing treaties first
became a standard part of United States treaty interpretation in Foster &
Elam v. Neilson.' In Foster, the Supreme Court considered the domestic
effect of an 1819 treaty conveying West Florida from Spain to the United
States. Chief Justice Marshall stated that,
[A treaty is] to be regarded in Courts of justice as equivalent to an act
of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a
contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act,
the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department;
and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule
for the Court.4
Thus, a self-executing treaty automatically gains domestic force once
it is ratified. In contrast, an agreement which is not self-executing
requires legislative enactments by Congress in order to gain domestic
application in the United States.
Deciding whether a treaty is self-executing is largely a matter within
the interpretive discretion of the judiciary. In its analysis, the court
will look to the wording of the treaty for any language which expressly
calls for implementing legislation.47 Courts will consider the intent of
(1967) (The federal government, being a government of limited powers, is still precluded from
regulating large areas of intrastate matters. It is unnecessary and unsound to cut down this
area of intrastate jurisdiction over human rights through the medium of international
agreements). See also Rovine, supra note 37, at 60 (comparing genocide to murder, which is a
matter of domestic jurisdiction and not international law).
43. Louis HENKiN, FOREIGN AFFAms AND THE CoNsrrrION 151-56 (1972).
44. Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
45. Id. at 314.
46. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
See also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) (holding that a treaty must stipulate that it
is self-executing).
47. Aerovias Interamericanas de Panama, S.A. v. Bd. of County Coinm's, 197 F. Supp. 230
(S.D. Fla. 1961), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Bd. of County Comm's v. Aerolineas Peruanasa,
S.A., 307 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 961 (1963).
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the drafters to determine what the parties intended the domestic effect
of their agreement to be. Treaty drafters are usually able to structure
the language of a treaty so that the executing nature of the treaty is
predetermined. In fact, a major issue in the United States of many, if not
most, international treaties is whether the document will be self-
executing. The general position that the United States maintains on the
nature of human rights treaties is that they are not self-executing and do
not supersede state law in the absence of implementing legislation by
Congress.9
While many countries do not make this distinction,' the United
States has used this judicial doctrine as a method to prevent human
rights treaties from creating domestic legal obligations in the absence of
Congressional legislation. Without such legislation, no individual may
sue in a United States court to enforce the provisions of the Convention.
The plain language of the American Convention, however, strongly
supports an interpretation that it is self-executing. Article 2 specifically
addresses the means by which the American Convention is to be
incorporated into the domestic law of state parties:
Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in
Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the
Where a treaty is incomplete either because it expressly calls for implementing
legislation or because it calls for the performance of a particular affirmative act by the
contracting sovereigns, which act or acts can only be performed through a legislative
act, such a treaty is for obvious reasons not self-executing and subsequent legislation
must be enacted before such treaty is enforceable by the courts.... On the other
hand, where a treaty is full and complete, it is generally considered to be self-
executing by the courts.
Aerovias Interamericanas, 197 F. Supp. at 245-46.
48. Postal, 589 F.2d at 876 ("As in the case of all matters of interpretation, the courts
attempt to discern the intent of the parties to the agreement so as to carry out their manifest
purpose.").
49. HENICN, supra note 43, at 159-60. For an example of the United States position
towards human rights treaties, see Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) rev'd
242 P.2d 617 (1950). The California Court of Appeals held California's Alien Land Law
unenforceable since it was discriminatory towards Asians in violation of the human rights
provisions of the U.N. Charter. The Court reasoned that the Charter, as a treaty of the United
States, was equal in rank to federal statutes and was "supreme law of the land" thus
superseding any inconsistent state legislation. Id. at 486-88. Senator John Bricker of Ohio was
one of the most vocal opponents of this interpretation of the domestic effect of the U.N.
Charter. 98 CONG. REC. 911 (1952) ("If the Fujii case (Court of Appeals ruling) should
eventually be affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, or if the principle announced
therein should be sustained, literally thousands of federal and state laws will automatically
become invalid.").
Fujii was overturned. The California Supreme Court determined that the human rights
provisions of the U.N. Charter were not self-executing, that is, they could not supersede state
laws unless they were implemented by Congressional legislation. Sei Fujii, 242 P.2d at 617.
50. HENKIN, supra note 43, at 156 (stating that the distinction between self-executing and
not self- executing treaties is characteristic of Western parliamentary systems).
THE AMERICAN CONVENTION
State Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional
processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or
freedoms.5'
This language does not call for implementing legislation before the
rights and freedoms of the American Convention are applicable
domestically. It states, unambiguously, that if the enumerated rights are
not already ensured by domestic legislation, states are required to take
legislative action to give effect to those rights. 2 The United States,
however, has interpreted this Article to mean that the Treaty is not self-
executing, thus barring domestic application until the legislature takes
action to translate its provisions into domestic law. According to the
United States:
The article is sufficiently flexible so that each country can best
implement the treaty consistent with its domestic practices.... Some
countries may choose to make the articles of the treaty directly effective
as domestic law and this article would permit them to do so. In the
U.S. we would interpret this article as authorizing... us to refer, where
appropriate, to our Constitution, to our domestic legislation already in
existence, to our court decisions and to our administrative practice as
carrying out the obligations of the Convention. In other words, it is not
the intention of the U.S. to interpret the articles of the treaty in Part I as
being self-executing.'
Nothing in the language of the Treaty or the intent of the drafters
indicates that a state may, at its leisure, refer to its domestic legislation,
its court decisions, or its administrative law and practice before
determining which rights of the, American Convention to implement,
how to incorporate them into domestic law, and when to make them
domestically applicable. Both the plain language of the Treaty and the
intent of its drafters indicate that once a state becomes a party, the
provisions of the Convention become binding and the state is required
to provide its citizens with the rights and freedoms enumerated
therein s4
51. American Convention, supra note 12, art. 2, 9 I.L.M. at 102.
52. Id.
53. Conferencia Especializada Interamericana Sobre Derechos Humanos, San Jose, Costa Rica, 7-22
de Noviembre 1969, Actas y Documentos, 146-47, OEA/SER. K/XVI/1.2 (1973) [hereinafter
Conferencia Especializada Interamericana] (United States delegation statement). See also Donald T.
Fox, The American Convention on Human Rights and Prospects for United States Ratification, 3 HuM.
RTs. 243, 259-60 (1973) (saying the United States delegation explained that United States law
would not consider the Convention self-executing).
54. American Convention, supra note 12, art. 1, para. 1, 9 I.L.M. at 101 ("The State Parties
to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to
ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction, the free exercise of these rights and
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B. Federal Clause
Interpreting the treaty as not self-executing, however, is only one
method pursued by the United States to weaken the potential domestic
effect of the Convention. The United States has also relied on a "federal
clause" in the treaty to lessen the federal government's responsibility for
compliance by the individual states.' At the insistence of the United
States delegation, a clause was included in the American Convention
which limits the obligations of a national government in a federal system
to assure compliance with the treaty by the local governments of its
constituent units. 6
In an effort to protect the legislative power of its fifty states, the
United States interprets the federal clause to relieve the federal
government of the duty to prevent violations of the American
Convention by state governments and from interfering in affairs which
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the statesY
This interpretation allows the states to retain their existing laws,
adopt changes on their own terms, and does not require the United
States government to exercise its jurisdiction "over subject matter over
which it would not exercise authority in the absence of the Convention.
The United States is merely obligated to take suitable measures to the
end that state and local authorities may adopt provisions for the
fulfillment of this Convention.se
fteedoms.").
For the drafters' intent that the treaty be self-executing, see Thomas Buergenthal, The Self-
Executing Character of the Convention, in PROTECTNG HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: SELECTED
PROBLEMS, supra note 12, at 51, 52-53.
55. Fox, supra note 53, at 250-54.
56. Thomas Buergenthal, The Federal Clause of the American Convention, in PROTECTING
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: SELECrED PROBLEMS, supra note 12, at 49, 49-51. The
Convention states:
1. Where a State Party is constituted as a federal state, the national government of
such State Party shall implement all the provisions of the Convention over whose
subject matter it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction.
2. With respect to the provisions over whose subject matter the constituent units of
the federal state have jurisdiction, the national government shall immediately take
suitable measures, in accordance with its constitution and its laws, to the end that the
competent authorities of the constituent units may adopt appropriate provisions for
the fulfillment of this Convention.
American Convention, supra note 12, art. 28, 9 I.L.M. at 109.
57. United States: Report of the Delegation to the Inter-American Specialized Conference on
Human Rights (April 22, 1970), 9 I.L.M. 710, 733 (1970).
58. Id. at 733 (citation omitted). "Suitable measures could consist of recommendations
to the states, for example. The determination of what measures are suitable is a matter for
internal decision. The Convention does not require enactment of legislation bringing new
subject matter within the federal ambit." Id.
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The United States interpretation, however, reduces the effectiveness
of the American Convention by relieving the federal government of
responsibility for the action of its states. The language of the treaty's
federal clause requires a federal government to "take suitable measures"
to bring the laws of the constituent units into compliance with the
provisions of the Convention. Nowhere does the language imply that
a federal government is relieved of responsibility for violations by the
individual states. Nowhere does the language of the federal clause
assert that a state party may be in compliance with the Convention while
its constituent units fail to adhere to its provisions. Theoretically, under
the United States interpretation, individual state governments could
maintain legislation inconsistent with the American Convention's
requirements without risking treaty violations by the national
government. States which fail to comply with Convention requirements
may, under this interpretation of the federal clause, be advised or
persuaded, but not forced to change their laws by the federal
government. Thus, noncompliance by an individual state would not
hold the United States in violation of the Convention. 9
C. Declarations, Reservations, and Understandings
The United States Department of Justice has suggested a number of
reservations, declarations, and understandings to the Convention which
would further weaken the treaty's effect.6 For example, to assure that
the treaty will not be self-executing, the Justice Department suggests a
declaration to accompany ratification stating that "the United States
declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 32 of this Convention
are not self-executing."61 To insure that the federal government
need not interfere with state regulation of the death penalty, another
reservation is suggested: "United States adherence to Article 4 is subject
to the Constitution and other laws of the United States."62 These are
only two examples of the thirteen reservations or declarations suggested
by the Justice Department to accompany United States ratification of the
American Convention.' While such provisions address any fears that
United States' participation could minimize state sovereignty, they also
weaken the effectiveness of the Convention. Declarations that render the
treaty not self-executing prevent individuals from bringing claims in
domestic courts for violations of the treaty. They also deprive the Inter-
59. For example, "individual states within the United States with laws that provide for
the death penalty could retain them by virtue of Article 28 [Federal Clause] without the United
States being in violation of the Convention." Id. at 717.
60. Letter to President Carter, supra note 27, at 104-13.
61. Id. at 105.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 104.
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American Court and Commission of the benefit of United States court
decisions that interpret the Convention, preventing interaction between
domestic courts in the United States and the Inter-American Court."6
A treaty crippled by reservations designed to make the treaty fully
consistent with United States law is not a legal obligation at all. The
treaty's effectiveness as an incentive for domestic legal reform or
improvement is weakened by this attitude. United States ratification of
a less forceful version of the Convention will reflect a lack of good faith
on the part of the United States to enter into legal obligations that other
members of the Convention have already agreed upon.'
IV. SOVEREIGNTY CONCERNS:
DOMESTIC JURISDICTION OVER HUMAN RIGHTS
The American people want to make certain that no treaty or executive
agreement will be effective to deny or abridge their fundamental rights.
Also, they do not want their basic human rights to be supervised or
controlled by international agencies over which they have no control.'
These are the concerns of Senator John Bricker which contributed to
his proposed Constitutional amendment in 1953 (Bricker Amendment).
The Bricker Amendment was designed to restrict the President's treaty
making authority and to impose limits on a treaty's content.67
Although the amendment was narrowly defeated in the Senate,' it led
64. Buergenthal, supra note 35, at 51-52.
65. Human Rights Hearings, supra note 16 (statement of Charles Yost, former U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations).
Our refusal to join in the international implementation of the principles we so loudly
and frequently proclaim cannot help but give the impression that we do not practice
what we preach... we seriously undermine our own case when we resist joining in
the international endeavor to enforce these rights, which we ourselves had so much
to do with launching.
Id.
66. Hearings on S.J. Res. I and S.1. Res. 43 Before Subcomm. on the Judiciary of the United
States Senate, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1953) [hereinafter Hearings on S.J. Res. I and S.f. Res. 43]
(statement of Hon. John W. Bricker, Ohio).
67. Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights: U.S. Policy and Priorities, 14 VA. J.
INT'L L. 611, 612 (1974). The Bricker Amendment had three basic aims: 1) to establish that all
international agreements require implementing legislation and are thus not self-executing, 2)
to reverse the Supreme Court's ruling in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), that the Tenth
Amendment does not apply to treaty implementing legislation since the power to make treaties
rests with the federal government, and 3) to establish that treaties are subject to the same
constitutional constraints which limit the power of the federal government. Id. at 612.
68. Bricker Treaty Amendment Debate, Report on Defeat of Bricker Amendment, 83rd Congress
2nd Session, in CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAc X, 254-62 (1954). See also Symposium,
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to a statement by former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that the
United States Department of State would not seek ratification of any
human rights treaties,69 and created a legacy which is still reflected in
current Senate deliberations over human rights treaties."0 The ideology
behind the Bricker Amendment and Secretary of State Dulles' declaration
have left a lasting mark on human rights policy in the United States."
Arguments against passage of human rights treaties have not
changed substantially since the 1950s.' These arguments reflect the
attitude that human rights are a matter to be left exclusively to the
domestic legislation of a sovereign state. They are not to be controlled
through international agreement or monitored by international
tribunals. 3  Many Senators feel that "there are severe limits to the
extent that a nation can and should shape its domestic, social, economic,
and political order by making a treaty. These matters are for local
communities, towns, cities, and states."' From this perspective, human
rights and civil liberties are exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction
of the United States and are not the proper subject of an international
agreement. 5 This isolationist perspective, however, is marked by
residual fears lingering from the days of the Bricker Amendment which
are unfounded and create unnecessary obstacles to ratification of human
rights treaties in the United States.76
The United States Constitution imposes no limitations on the subject
matter of international agreements in which the government may
participate. The Constitution refers to treaties and agreements with
foreign powers,' but does not define such agreements or limit their
subject matter. There is no constitutional requirement that treaties
exclusively address matters of "international concern."' In fact, the
Supreme Court has upheld treaties on matters that were exclusively
Should the Constitution Be Amended to Limit the Treaty Making Power?, 26 S. CAL. L. REv. 346
(1953) (expressing arguments both for and against the Bricker Amendment).
69. Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.1. Res. 43, supra note 66, at 825 (statement of Hon. John
Foster Dulles, Secretary of State of the United States).
70. Hevener Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 37, at 310.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 334.
73. Henkin, supra note 7, at 422.
74. Rovine, supra note 37, at 60.
75. Report of the Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations, Human Rights
Conventions and Recommendations, supra note 42, at 601. See also John M. Raymond, Don't Ratify
the Human Rights Conventions, 54 A.B.A. J. 141 (1968) (arguing that the treaties will be ineffective
against oppressive governments and would meddle in domestic affairs).
76. Bitker, supra note 36, at 90.
77. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 10, art. II, § 2, art. VI.
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 302
ant. c (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS].
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domestic in nature and generally regarded to be within state, rather than
federal, authority. The Court, in defining the scope of the President's
treaty making power has never held a treaty invalid because it dealt
with an "improper" subject, nor has the President or Senate ever rejected
a treaty because the subject matter was not constitutionally "proper."8
Furthermore, international law imposes no limitations on the
purpose or subject matter of international agreements other than that
they may not conflict with a peremptory norm of international law.81
While the principle of "non-interference in domestic affairs" as defined
by Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter does limit the jurisdictional authority
of the U.N. over matters of domestic concern,82 human rights have been
carved out as a specific exception. 3
In addition, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recognizes
the "ever-increasing importance of treaties" as a means of assuring
"universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms."' In light of the wording of the Vienna Convention, it is
clear that human rights are a proper subject of international agreements.
By becoming parties to human rights treaties, states have
acknowledged that their treatment of individuals is not solely a matter
of domestic concern.' The principle of noninterference in domestic
affairs does not shield states from scrutiny or censure should they
torture, murder, or arbitrarily imprison their citizens.' 6 The modem
development of an international body of human rights law, the existence
of universal and regional structures to monitor human rights protection
and the increasing influence of nongovernmental human rights
organizations in the international community grow out of the ideology
79. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (protection of migratory waterfowl); De
Geofrey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890) (rights of inheritance in land).
80. Louis Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties and International Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L.
REV. 1012, 1020 (1968).
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) op FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 78, § 302 cmt. c. See also
LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW § 21 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (stating
both international and domestic law regulate the same individual conduct; international law,
however, attributes this individual conduct to the state).
82. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state.").
83. See generally Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866 (1990) (arguing that no serious scholar maintains that
human rights are a purely domestic concern).
84. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Apr. 24, 1970, pmbl., 8 I.L.M. 679, 680
(1969) (sent to the Senate Nov. 22, 1971).
85. "Today, human rights are of deep 'international concern;' they have an important
place in the foreign relations of the United States. Human rights in other countries have
become, ineluctably, this country's business." Henkin, supra note 80, at 1030.
86. Id. (human rights in a given nation have become ineluctably the business of other
nations).
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that fundamental human rights are of universal concernY International
agreements which protect individual rights, therefore, have a primary
place in international law.'
V. SPECIFIC OBJECrIONS
A. Abortion
Specific provisions of the American Convention have caused
concerns in the United States over the potential effect on legal abortions
and the death penalty. The American Convention describes the right-to-
life in the following terms: "Every person has the right to have his life
respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the
moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life."'
The unique wording of Article 4 differs from the right-to-life
provisions in either the Universal Declaration, the U.N. Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, or the European Convention.' Undertaking
the protection of life "from the moment of conception" has caused
concern that ratification could result in a prohibition of legal abortions
in the United States.
Some have argued9' that the United States has failed to protect life
"from the moment of conception" by permitting abortions in accordance
with the Supreme Court ruling in Roe v. Wade.' Ratification of the
Convention, therefore, may expose the United States to an international
lawsuit and potentially unfavorable ruling by the Inter-American Court
or Commission.
In fact, because of its participation in the American Declaration, the
United States already has faced such a challenge before the Inter-
87. Id. at 1012.
88. "For decades now, 'in the ordinary intercourse of nations,' human rights have 'been
made subjects of negotiation and treaty.' Surely, the Constitution does not prohibit the United
States from negotiating and adhering to such treaties." Id. at 1031.
89. American Convention, supra note 12, art. 4, para. 1, 9 LL.M. at 102.
90. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, Rights and Duties Established by the American Convention
on Human Rights, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 21, 26 (1981) (discussing differences between the wording
of the Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
91. On January 19, 1977, the group "Catholics for Political Action" filed a petition with
the Commission against the United States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for
permitting legal abortions in violation of the American Declaration's "right to life provision."
Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9, rev. 1, para. 1 (1981) (White, Potter
v. United States, commonly known as the Baby Boy Case). The Inter-American Commission
rejected this argument and suggested that neither the Declaration's nor the Convention's right
to life provisions prohibited abortion. Id. para. 19(e)-(h). For a discussion of the Baby Boy Case,
see Dinah Shelton, Abortion and the Right to Life in the Inter-American System: The Case of Baby
Boy, 2 HuM. Rms. L.J. 309 (1979).
92. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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American Commission on Human Rights. In the case of White & Potter
v. United States,9 3  United States' laws permitting abortion were
challenged as a violation of the right-to-life provision of Article I of the
Declaration. Based upon legislative history, the Commission found that
the obligations incurred under the American Declaration of Human
Rights did not include a prohibition of abortion.' The legislative
history of the Declaration reveals that a right-to-life "from the moment
of conception" was deliberately excluded by the drafters of the
Declaration because such a provision was incompatible with the laws
governing the death penalty and abortion in the majority of the
American states.95
A similar examination of the legislative history of the American
Convention reveals the same sensitivity on the part of the drafters
toward domestic laws of member states allowing abortion. The original
draft of the Convention, submitted to the Commission by the Inter-
American Council of Jurists, provided a right-to-life "protected by law
from the moment of conception."' Recognizing that this could be
interpreted as a prohibition of abortion, the words "in general" were
added as a qualification to Article 4. Thus, the phrase, "in general, from
the moment of conception," was intended by the drafters to refer to a
right-to-life which did not interfere with the status of legal abortions in
American countries at the time the Convention was drafted.
Accordingly, the legal implications of the terminology "in general from
the moment of conception" are substantially different from the shorter
phrase "from the moment of conception."97
The legislative history behind the Declaration and the Convention
indicate that neither document was intended to require member states
with laws permitting abortions to alter their domestic legislation. Both
the United States and Brazil made statements on the record at the San
Jos6 Conference affirming this interpretation of the Convention. Both
countries interpret the language of paragraph 1 of Article 4 as
"preserving to State Parties discretion with respect to the content of
93. Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25.
94. Id. paras. 19(e)-(h).
95. Id.
96. Opinion Prepared by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the Draft
Convention on Human Rights Approved by the Inter-American Council of Jurists at Its Fourth Meeting
(Santiago Chile, 1959), OEA/Ser.L/V/Il.15, doc. 26 at 3-4 (1966) (giving preference to a draft of
the Convention submitted by Uruguay but suggesting that the words "in general" be added
to the protection of life "from the moment of conception"). See also IACHR Annotations on the
Draft Inter-American Convention on Protection of Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/11.19, doc. 53 at
10 (1969).
97. Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, para. 30 ("In the light of this history, it is clear that
the... addition of the phrase 'in general, from the moment of conception' does not mean that
the drafters of the Convention intended to modify the concept of the right to life that prevailed
in Bogota, when they approved the American Declaration.").
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legislation in the light of their own social development, experience and
similar factors." 98 The government of Mexico made a similar
interpretive declaration at the time of ratification, stating its belief that
the right-to-life language of the Convention would not require Mexico
to outlaw abortions. The legislative history of the American
Convention and declarations made by the U.S. at the time of drafting
indicate that the wording of Article 4 should not prohibit legal abortions
in the United States.
B. The Death Penalty
Another example of the potential for interference with state
legislation created by the American Convention is found in Article 4's
prohibition of the death penalty for persons under 18 or over 70."'
Since several states in the United States currently permit the death
penalty for persons under the age of 18,"1 supporters of current death
penalty statutes oppose ratification claiming it would interfere with the
legislative discretion of states by compelling the federal government to
regulate use of the death penalty among the states."°
Despite concerns over the right-to-life language in the American
Convention, it is important to note that it does not prohibit the death
penalty. Rather, the Convention limits use of the death penalty to only
the most serious crimes and explicitly prohibits a sentence of death for
political offenders, persons under the age of 18 or over 70, and pregnant
women."°a It also insures the right of appeal and prohibits the re-
establishment of the death penalty in countries where it has been
abolished. 4 These restrictions would only affect states that have
already abolished the death penalty or that allow execution of juveniles
under the age of 18. Opposition to the Convention on the basis that
states may have to change their death penalty laws is unwarranted. The
changes required under the American Convention are no different than
98. United States: Report of the Delegation of the Inter-American Specialized Conference on
Human Rights, supra note 57, at 717.
99. Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.71, doc. 6 rev. 1 at 62 (1987) ("[Tlhe Government of Mexico considers that the
expression 'in general' does not constitute an obligation to adopt, or keep in force, legislation
to protect life 'from the moment of conception,' since this matter falls within the domain
reserved to the States.").
100. American Convention, supra note 12, art. 4, para. 5, 9 I.L.M. at 102.
101. Amnesty International, The Truth About the Death Penalty in the United States Is Real
News, Briefing Paper, Amnesty International, U.S.A., N.Y. Office, June 1990.
102. Joan Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms
Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 655, 687 (1983) (discussing
United States reluctance to adopt international norms which invalidate inconsistent state
legislation).
103. American Convention, supra note 12, art. 4, paras. 2-6, 9 I.L.M. at 102.
104. Id. art. 4, paras. 1-4, 9 I.L.M. at 102.
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those already required under the American Declaration."~ While the
Convention would force the federal government to limit state laws
governing application of the death penalty in certain cases, the
Declaration has already imposed such obligations on the federal
government.'" The United States is currently in violation of the
international human rights obligations it has undertaken in the
Declaration for failure to assure uniform, nonarbitrary application of the
death penalty nationwide. °7 Accordingly, adoption of the Convention
would not impose any greater requirement on the federal government
than has already been imposed by United States participation in the
Declaration, and would be a means of approaching a uniform standard
regulating the use of the death penalty throughout the nation.
VI. REASONS FOR RATIFICATION
Promotion of any human rights treaty in this country requires two
steps. First, proponents of ratification must overcome the legacy of the
Bricker Amendment and the Cold War era when human rights treaties
were immediately suspect in the United States." The foregoing
analysis of objections to the Convention has attempted to address these
fears by demonstrating that the Convention poses no threat to the
domestic legal order of the United States.1' 9
Overcoming the legal objections to ratification is, however, only part
of the process. The central problem behind ratification is a political
one."0 Legal barriers to ratification can be overcome if the political
105. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has ruled the U.S. is currently in
violation of its duties under the American Declaration because of its failure to regulate the laws
of those states which allow for execution of juveniles.
For the federal government of the United States to leave the issue of the application
of the death penalty to juveniles to the discretion of State officials results in a
patchwork scheme of legislation which makes the severity of punishment dependent,
riot, primarily, on the nature of the crime committed, but on the location where it
was committed.... The failure of the federal government to preempt the states as
regards this most fundamental right-the right to life-results in a pattern of
arbitrary deprivation of life and inequality before the law, contrary to Articles I and
II of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, respectively.
Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 30, OEA/Ser. L./V./IL71, doc. 9 rev.1, para. 63 (1987).
106. Donald Fox, Current Development: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Finds
United States in Violation, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 601 (1988).
107. Id.
108. Hevener Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 37, at 310.
109. The United States Department of Justice has expressed the opinion that, with the
appropriate reservations and declarations, there are no Constitutional or legal objections to
ratification of the Convention. Letter to President Carter, supra note 27.
110. Richard Falk, Ideological Patterns in the United States Human Rights Debate, in THE
DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 36, at 29. In order for a human rights policy to be
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will exists to move this treaty through the Senate. Unfortunately, there
is an almost universal perception in the Senate that human rights treaties
are controversial, politically costly, and lack tangible rewards. 1 '
Ratification will depend largely upon how successfully supporters of the
Convention can demonstrate the political, diplomatic, economic, and
social advantages of participation in the American Convention.
Senate reluctance to act on the Convention can be overcome through
popular support for human rights treaties and a growing awareness of
human rights issues in the United States. In 1977, the year when
President Carter sent the Convention to the Senate for approval, one of
the world's foremost human rights organizations, Amnesty International,
had 10,000 members in the United States."2 Today that number has
grown to 386,000."' Recognizing the increasing popular concern with
international human rights, the United States administration has found
it politically expedient to take an increasingly moralistic stand in its
dealings with other countries in this hemisphere. "Operation Just
Cause" in Panama," 4 the United States "rescue mission" in
Grenada,"' and "Operation Desert Storm"" 6 demonstrate the
tendency to couch strategic operations in the language of moral
justification to elicit popular support and approval. In addition, the
United States has also been quick to criticize many Central American
countries for widespread and persistent abuses of human rights"7 and
regularly conditions its foreign assistance funds on human rights
politically successful in the United States it must be supported by a "right-leaning centrist
coalition" and political leaders must reconcile human rights initiatives with the "short and long-
term geopolitical interests of the United States." Id. at 46.
111. Hevener Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 37, at 332-33.
112. Figures as of July 1,1991. Telephone conversation with Amnesty International U.S.A.,
National Membership Office, New York, N.Y. (July 1, 1991).
113. Id.
114. Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Troops Move in Panama, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1989, at Al
(presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater saying that the operation was designed to restore
democracy in Panama and to bring Noriega to the United States to face drug trafficking
charges).
115. Ed Magnuson, D-Day in Grenada, TIME, Nov. 7, 1983, at 22 (saying the invasion was
intended to protect and rescue 1,000 Americans trapped on the island after a bloody Marxist
coup).
116. Ann Reilly Dowd, How Bush Decided, TIME, Feb. 11, 1991, at 45.
As the U.N. deadline approached, the President grappled one last time with the
morality of going to war. At the Christmas Holidays, he pored over every one of the
82 pages of Amnesty International's agonizing report of arrests, rape and torture in
Kuwait. In the first staff meeting after his 12-day respite at Camp David, he told
them his conscience was clear. Recalls one who was there: "He said, 'its black and
white, good vs. evil. The man has to be stopped!"
Id.
117. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACICES FOR
1990, 486-800 (1991) (publishing lengthy analysis of abuses in each Latin American country).
Spring 1992]
342 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 2:2
criteria."8 While dictating standards of behavior to other nations and
enforcing those standards financially and militarily, the United States
refuses to adhere to the basic instrument which represents the generally
recognized standard of human rights protection among American
nations. The United States threatens the integrity of its posture before
the nations of this hemisphere when it fails to bind itself to standards to
which it holds others and on which it justifies military intervention or
the denial of foreign financial assistance."9 Thus, the United States
appears hypocritical in holding the rest of this hemisphere to a standard
to which it refuses to adhere. 20 Recent world events indicate that in
this era, if the United States wishes to increase its influence among the
nations of this hemisphere, multilateral, rather than unilateral, action
must prevail. 2 ' The Organization of American States is an effective
framework for such multilateral action and enables the United States to
cooperate with its American allies for mutual gain.
In addition, the long-term economic interests of the United States are
best promoted by a foreign policy that assures the continued stability
and growth of smaller nations in this hemisphere with which it intends
to do business.' Assuring protection of human rights is a means of
promoting social and economic progress particularly in countries
frequently torn by social injustice and civil disorders.'Y Those nations
which ratify and adhere to the American Convention will safeguard
social and economic progress and create a better climate for business,
cultural, and political relations.24 More effective human rights
protection in many South and Central American countries would help
to forestall the possibility of uprising and civil disorders that disturb
peace and world security. As U.S. Senator William Proxmire stated:
"[W]here human rights are secure, peace is attendant. When the human
rights of any people are threatened, peace itself is threatened.""
118. See David Weissbrodt, Human Rights and the United States Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 231, 232 (1977). See also Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1990)
("No assistance may be provided to the government of any country which engages in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.").
119. Nigel Rodley, On the Necessity of United States Ratification of the International Human
Rights Conventions, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, supra note 27, at 3,
3-19.
120. Buergenthal, supra note 35, at 49 ("[I]f the United States does not ratify the
Convention, our political involvement in the American Convention system will, of necessity,
decrease, as will our influence."). See also Human Rights Hearings, supra note 16, at 4 (statement
of Hon. Charles Yost, former United States Ambassador to the United Nations).
121. Louis B. Sohn, International Consequences of United States Human Rights Policy, in THE
DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 36, at 63.
122. Richard N. Gardner, A Costly Anachronism, 53 A.B.A. J. 907, 908 (1967) (arguing that
peace, economic and social development, and human rights form a triangle of interdependence).
123. Donald Fraser, Freedom and Foreign Policy, 25 FOREIGN POL'Y 140 (1977).
124. Id.
125. 113 CONG. REc. 30,902, 30,903 (1967) (speech of Sen. Proxmire on the subject of the
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VII. CONCLUSION
Promotion and support of human rights treaties is in the best interest
of the United States. As the drafters of the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law recognized:
Although such conventions generally specify standards already
observed in the United States, it has an interest in seeing that they are
observed by as many states as possible, not merely to protect its own
standards, but to promote conditions abroad that will foster economic
development and democratic institutions that are conducive to
prosperity in the United States and achievement of its foreign policy
objectives. It cannot effectively urge other states to adhere to such
conventions without doing so itself."z
In order to increase its credibility as a nation committed to human
rights around the world, to enhance the level of its cooperation with
other nations in this hemisphere, and to promote an environment of
social and economic progress in this hemisphere, the United States
should ratify the American Convention.
Joseph Diab
Supplementary Slavery Convention).
126. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 118
(1965).
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